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(DIGITAL) TRESPASS: WHAT’S OLD IS NEW AGAIN 
HANNAH L. COOK† 
A digital trespass theory of Fourth Amendment searches is neces-
sary to maintain the relevance of the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Jones.1 At the time the Fourth Amendment was written, if a 
government official wanted to track a suspect, he needed to physically 
follow the suspect around to learn his whereabouts. If he wanted to read 
a suspect’s correspondence, he needed to enter the suspect’s home or 
office and take the physical letter. If he wanted to listen to a suspect’s 
conversation, he needed to hide under an open window or find an in-
formant. In 2017, these tactics are no longer necessary—we use electron-
ics to travel, write, and speak with one another. Unfortunately, these de-
vices can betray us without any physical interaction with law enforce-
ment, potentially confounding a Fourth Amendment whose authors never 
imagined law enforcement conducting a remote search and eviscerating 
the progress made in Jones.  
This article provides a solution to the problem of remote digital 
searches by proposing a theory of digital trespass, in which it is a search 
when law enforcement trespasses with technology by sending a targeted 
electronic signal that causes a device to take an action. This action could 
be sending information back to the government or changing how the 
device functions for the user. Part I of this article discusses early Fourth 
Amendment law grounded in trespass and the Supreme Court’s later 
move away from trespass. Part II discusses the return of trespass in Unit-
ed States v. Jones, demonstrating how the expansion of the Jones theory 
to digital trespass would unify current case law. Part III briefly discusses 
how a digital trespass theory is consistent with the principles of Katz v. 
United States.2 
I. FROM TRESPASS TO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY: 
OLMSTEAD AND KATZ 
In criminal law, whether a search has occurred is a critical finding: 
if there is no search, the defendant has no Fourth Amendment rights. 
During the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
emphasized the need for a physical trespass in order for a law enforce-
  
 † Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Many thanks to Kevin 
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 1. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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ment action to qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment.3 How-
ever, in 1967 the Court rejected the trespass theory in favor of a more 
flexible reasonable expectation of privacy test. This section describes the 
early trespass test and its demise.  
A. Olmstead’s Trespass Rationale 
In Olmstead v. United States,4 the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the Fourth Amendment protects physical things from physical trespass.5 
“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material 
things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects,” wrote Chief 
Justice Taft.6 This focus on the physical objects examined led the Court 
to conclude that a wiretap was not a search when the tapped wires were 
outside the defendant’s property.7 After all, the “intervening wires are 
not part of [the defendant’s] house or office, any more than are the high-
ways along which they are stretched,” so the defendant had no property 
interest in the wires and he and his effects were not searched.8 This em-
phasis on trespass changed with the decision in Katz v. United States in 
1967. 
B. Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
In Katz, the government recorded the defendant’s phone calls from 
a public phone booth using a tape recorder attached to the top of the 
phone booth.9 Katz challenged the recordings as a warrantless search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though there had been no tres-
pass against his private property. The Court concluded that “the under-
pinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subse-
quent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no long-
er be regarded as controlling.”10 This explicit rejection of the trespass test 
led to the adoption of a two-part test, proposed in Katz by Justice Harlan. 
Under this test, a search occurs if “a person exhibit[s] an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation [is] one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”11 This reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test replaced the trespass test in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence for 45 years until Jones. 
  
 3. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (holding police action could 
become an illegal search through “trespass or unlawful entry”). 
 4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 5. Id. at 464. 
 6. Id. Note that in the case of digital trespass, the physical device itself is being provoked to 
respond and reveal information, so the focus on interaction with physical objects remains similar to 
that in Olmstead. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 465. The Court noted that a trespass was not always sufficient for a search (as in the 
case where two police officers snuck onto a man’s land and saw him come outside and hand a bottle 
to a friend). Id. However, it appeared there could not be a search without a trespass. See id. 
 9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 10. Id. at 353. 
 11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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II. TO JONES AND BEYOND: EXPANDING PHYSICAL TRESPASS TO 
DIGITAL TRESPASS  
The primacy of the Katz test was thrown into question by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones. Writing for the majori-
ty, Justice Scalia reinvigorated the Olmstead trespass doctrine, at least in 
so far as trespass was an independent ground on which to find a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.12 This part briefly explains the Court’s 
reasoning in Jones and proposes expanding Jones to digital trespass—
trespasses that take place entirely electronically by sending a targeted 
signal to a suspect’s device to make it take some action. Second, it dis-
cusses a sample of Fourth Amendment cases and explains how digital 
trespass provides a harmonizing theory. 
A. Jones Revives Trespass Doctrine—And Potentially Creates Digital 
Trespass 
In Jones, the defendant challenged the government’s secret installa-
tion of a Global Positioning System (GPS) on the bottom of the car he 
used as a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.13 The 
GPS sent the police data tracking Jones’s movements for twenty-eight 
days, conveying more than 2,000 pages of data.14 Although lower courts 
had previously found that GPS data generated by cell phone usage15 was 
not necessarily covered by the Fourth Amendment (and therefore its use 
was not a search),16 the Supreme Court found that the installation and use 
of the GPS was a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that a “physical in-
trusion” like the installation and use of the GPS, independent of the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, was a sufficient basis to find a search 
  
 12. One caveat to this characterization is that a trespass is only a search if information is 
actually discovered. The mere installation of the GPS, if it had malfunctioned and not transmitted 
data, would likely not have been a search, especially since the main remedy for a Fourth Amendment 
violation is suppression of the evidence (and if the installation fails, there is no evidence to sup-
press). See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (“A holding to that effect would mean 
that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of picking up 
conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the microphone were not 
turned on.”). 
 13. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–04 (2012). The police had actually received a 
warrant, but did not follow the terms of its installation or use, so the Court proceeded as if there was 
no warrant. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Like the GPS in Jones, the phone conveys its location to a satellite, which is then reported 
back to a computer. See id. at 403. 
 16. See In re the Matter of the Appl. of the United States for an Order Directing Provider of 
Elec. Commun. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding 
request to company for GPS data does not require a warrant because it is not a search); see also In re 
Appl. of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding 
GPS data disclosed by a provider is not a search).  
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under the Fourth Amendment.17Although Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that the Court’s post-Katz jurisprudence had “deviated from th[e] exclu-
sively property-based approach” used in Olmstead, he concluded that 
“Katz did not repudiate [the trespass-based] understanding” of the Fourth 
Amendment.18 In fact, for “most of our history the Fourth Amend-
ment was understood to embody a particular concern for government 
trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enu-
merates.”19 
Although this trespass approach reached the reasonable result in 
Jones itself, it creates an intriguing problem noted by both concurrenc-
es—that a digital trespass may soon allow law enforcement to receive 
identical GPS data about a vehicle without law enforcement physically 
installing a GPS.20 Many cars now come with GPS devices built into the 
vehicle to assist with navigation and accident response, such as the popu-
lar OnStar system (which tracks a car’s location and speed by default 
even if the owner is not a paying OnStar customer).21 A government 
agent that remotely accessed a car’s GPS so that it provided location data 
to a government computer would never have to commit a physical tres-
pass.  
However, Jones’s trespass theory need not be confined to physical 
trespasses, and expanding it to digital trespasses provides a logical theory 
for current and future case law. A digital trespass takes place whenever a 
government agent sends a targeted signal to a user’s device, causing the 
device to return some information or take some action.22 Note that the 
requirement of a targeted signal to a device eliminates the potential for 
digital plain view23 as well as the issue of dragnet surveillance. This digi-
  
 17. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been 
considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
 18. Id. at 405. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of 
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion's trespas-
sory test may provide little guidance.”); id. at 426 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court's reliance on 
the law of trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is 
carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”). 
 21. David Kravets, OnStar Tracks Your Car Even When You Cancel Service, WIRED (Sept. 
20, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/09/onstar-tracks-you/.  
 22. For example, the device could return its location or provide a copy of all IP addresses 
visited by the device. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed 
in Court Fight, WIRED (Apr. 09, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-
aircard/all/ (explaining the use of government configured aircard to return device’s location).  
 23. Which, for example, might have been available if the government rather than Google had 
accessed the unencrypted wireless traffic in Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013). The plain 
view exception to the Fourth Amendment has a complicated relationship with computers. Compare 
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding plain view exception allows 
search of every file on a hard drive) with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding plain view exception does not allow search of every file on a hard drive). This debate is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
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tal trespass theory is consistent with existing trespass law and existing 
criminal law involving computer access. 
Trespass law has never been confined to when a person physically 
intrudes on another’s private property—it is sufficient that the trespasser 
has physical or legal control over the intrusion. For example, at common 
law, a trespass by livestock was an almost strict liability tort by the live-
stock owner—if Smith’s cow went onto Jones’s property and injured 
Jones, Smith could be liable even if he was not negligent in confining the 
cow and never set foot on Jones’s land.24 Trespass cases due to pollution 
are common; in many of these cases the trespasser never set foot on the 
contaminated land.25 If an undirected animal or cloud of pollution inter-
acting with another’s property can be a trespass, it is hard to imagine 
why a directed wireless signal interacting with another’s property would 
be any less of a trespass. 
Furthermore, the idea of being able to trespass digitally on a com-
puter, and using a computer or other technology to do so, is not novel.26 
Some states have criminalized “computer trespass” by statute.27 Alt-
hough the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not use the term 
“trespass,” it uses similar language to the state statutes.28 While there is 
an active scholarly debate about whether computer crimes should be un-
derstood in terms of physical trespass or not,29 it is clear that trespass is a 
viable framework for conceptualizing gaining access to, or information 
from, electronic devices.  
Furthermore, courts have accepted the idea that one could commit a 
computer trespass using other technology, rather than physically sitting 
down at the computer and attempting to access it. For example, in State 
  
 24. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Liability for Personal Injury or Death Caused by Trespass-
ing or Intruding Livestock, 49 A.L.R. 4th 710, § 3(a) (2012) (“the possessor of livestock may be held 
liable under the rule of strict liability, in actions based on a theory of trespass, for personal injuries 
caused by their animals while intruding on the lands of others”). 
 25. See 5-17 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE § 17.01 (2015) (collecting cases); see also Jill 
E. Evans, See Repose Run: Setting the Boundaries of the Rule of Repose in Environmental Trespass 
and Nuisance Cases, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 132 (2013) (“As a result, a 
number of environmental trespass and nuisance cases involve the unseen migration of pollutants 
through ground soil or groundwater onto adjoining property.”). 
 26. The difference between using a computer to trespass and trespassing on a computer is 
trivial, since generally there will be computer-like technology on both ends of a digital trespass. 
 27. See, e.g.,  WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.110 (repealed 2016) (“A person is guilty of com-
puter trespass in the first degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a 
computer system . . . and . . . [t]he access is made with the intent to commit another crime[] or . . . 
[t]he violation involves a computer or database maintained by a government agency.”). 
 28. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information 
from any department or agency of the United States[] or . . . information from any protected comput-
er . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.”). 
 29. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in 
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1618-22 (2003) (arguing trespass is an insuffi-
cient analogy for computer crime).  
6 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
v. Riley,30 the Washington Supreme Court held that the defendant had 
committed a computer trespass by calling a telephone company’s general 
access number and dialing random numbers to discover access codes to 
the company’s computer system (which allowed the defendant to make 
long-distance calls while charging them to other customers).31 The de-
fendant unsuccessfully argued that he should be charged with telephone 
fraud, rather than computer trespass, because he did not directly access 
the data on the computer—he just entered numbers on his phone and 
learned whether he was able to make long-distance calls after entering 
the numbers.32 The court rejected this argument, noting that Riley had 
“accessed” the computer in violation of the statute by “approach[ing]” or 
“mak[ing] use of any resources of a computer.”33 A digital trespass takes 
a similar form—using one piece of technology (be it a computer or more 
specialized device such as a Stingray34) to make use of the resources of 
another piece of technology. 
B. Harmonizing Precedent with Digital Trespass 
Supreme Court precedent is already consistent in many ways with 
the digital trespass theory described above. For example, the theory is 
consistent with the Court’s decisions in United States v. Karo35 and Unit-
ed States v. Knotts.36 Karo and Knotts are befuddling. The two cases, 
decided less than two years apart, come to opposite conclusions about 
very similar facts. Although neither could be considered a search under 
the digital trespass theory due to the technology at stake, the theory is 
consistent with the logic underlying both decisions.  
In Knotts, the Supreme Court found it was not a search when gov-
ernment agents inserted a tracking beeper, which emitted radio signals 
that could be picked up by radio receivers, into a container of chloroform 
being transported by Knotts.37 The court found there was no search be-
cause the beeper was not relaying any new information to law enforce-
ment—the beeper was only assisting law enforcement in their visual sur-
veillance of the suspect as he transported the chloroform.38 This would 
not be a search under a digital trespass theory either. The government 
receiver is not sending a targeting signal—the beeper simply emits data 
that can be picked up by anyone, and the government does not “ping” the 
beeper to ask it to return data (the beeper transmits constantly). In to-
  
 30. 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993). 
 31. Id. at 1373. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. For a discussion of how Stingrays can be used to gather information by law enforcement, 
see United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2016) (Wood, dissenting).  
 35. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 36. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 37. Id. at 277. 
 38. Id. at 281 (“The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case 
amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.”).  
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day’s terms, replacing “beeper” and “receiver” with “computer” illus-
trates one limitation incorporated by the digital trespass theory, which is 
consistent with Knotts—if the government can pick up information that 
is being freely broadcast using a standard-issue receiver, it is not a 
search. 
In Karo, the government inserted a similar beeper into a can of ether 
and had an informant swap the beeper can with one of the cans Karo was 
transporting.39 Although the Court conceded there may have been a 
“technical trespass,” they found the beeper’s installation was not a search 
because the informant had agreed when the can was in his possession and 
the government had created only the “potential for an invasion of priva-
cy.”40 However, the Court held that it was a search to use the beeper to 
gain locational information once the beeper was off public roads and on 
the defendant’s property.41 This focus on gaining access to otherwise 
unavailable (at least without a warrant) information is also reflected in 
the digital trespass test—the government’s targeted signal must be effec-
tive in inducing a response from the suspect’s device. The government’s 
mere ability to ask a device for information cannot logically constitute a 
search, unless it actually asks for information from a device and receives 
it.42  
Digital trespass carries forward Knotts’s and Karo’s themes that the 
government cannot turn a person’s property into an informant, while 
placing reasonable restrictions on what government behavior falls into 
that category. Knotts and Karo teach that a digital trespass requires gov-
ernment officials to reach out and ask a device for nonpublic infor-
mation. The modern analogue to the continually transmitting beeper on 
public roadways in Knotts is information shared on an unsecured wire-
less network.43 The government need not ask the device to do anything in 
order to gain this information, just as the officers performed no physical 
trespass to follow Knotts.  
In addition to this outreach requirement, as the previous analogy 
suggests, the government must gain new information. Not only has the 
government failed to ask for anything in the wireless network example, it 
is not receiving nonpublic information—it is simply following our mod-
ern-day Karo down public information superhighways. Once the gov-
ernment moves to the private level of the device and has the device re-
  
 39. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708. 
 40. Id. at 712. 
 41. Id. at 715. 
 42. This approach is also consistent with lower court approaches to GPS data. For example, 
the Fifth Circuit found that government’s request for historical cell site data were not a search be-
cause the cell phone companies generate and keep locational data for their own business purposes 
and the government was not involved in their generation or retention. In re Application of the United 
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 43. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no search where 
defendant’s computer was located through its connection to an unsecured wireless network). 
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turn information that was not being shared, the government has stepped 
off the highway and onto the private property (for instance, the hard 
drive). At that point, the government has committed a trespassing search 
as in Karo. 
III. DIGITAL TRESPASS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT VALUES 
Although the majority in Jones noted that “Katz did not narrow the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope” and the Olmstead test provides an inde-
pendent basis for finding a search,44 the digital trespass test is consistent 
with the reasonable expectation of privacy test that dominated a half-
century of precedent. At least one court has disagreed, finding that a de-
fendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his devices 
when the government used technology to find and reprogram his aircard 
(a way of wirelessly accessing the internet from a laptop).45 However, the 
digital trespass test is consistent with the Katz test. Furthermore, it pro-
tects the notice interest reflected in both statutory law and the values of 
Katz. 
As discussed above, the Katz test requires a subjective expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.46 Especial-
ly in an age where so many programs and apps default to sharing (con-
sider, for example, when a PC asks if the user would like to share his or 
her files upon joining a wireless network or more insidious sharing de-
faults within social media applications), the user’s decision to not broad-
cast certain information is good evidence of a subjective expectation of 
privacy.47 Moreover, the public has expressed outrage at government 
monitoring of electronic devices such as computers and GPS-enabled 
phones. One Gallup poll found that 53% of Americans disapprove of the 
government “compil[ing] telephone call logs and Internet communica-
tions” while the same study found 57% would be somewhat or very con-
cerned their privacy rights had been violated if they were surveilled elec-
tronically.48 This concern has manifested itself in calls for greater en-
  
 44. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012). 
 45. United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65633, at *25–26 (D. Ariz. May 8, 
2013). The court’s opinion is not a model of clear reasoning and includes the fact that the devices 
were used in an “extensive scheme of fraud” as a reason to deny a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Presumably use in a crime cannot dictate the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, because other-
wise criminals would never have Fourth Amendment rights.  
 46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 47. Whether unsecured file sharing or wireless networks eliminates a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is an undecided topic. Compare United States v. Ahrndt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7223 (D. 
Or. Jan. 17, 2013) (finding search despite having shared files with wireless network) with United 
States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
location of computer after connecting to unsecured wireless network). Under either standard, the use 
of a secured network and applications to prevent dissemination of information reflects a subjective 
expectation of privacy. 
 48. Frank Newport, Americans Disapprove of Government Surveillance Programs, GALLUP 
(June 12, 2013) http://www.gallup.com/poll/163043/americans-disapprove-government-
surveillance-programs.aspx.  
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cryption of cell phones and other devices, as Representative Ted Lieu 
recently noted during hearings on encryption.49 It seems clear from these 
statistics that the public is prepared to recognize, and believes it has, an 
expectation of privacy in the information collected by electronic devices. 
Under these circumstances, the Katz test is satisfied and government’s 
technical manipulation to gain the information on these devices is a 
search. 
Finally, the digital trespass rule protects individuals from unknown, 
and perhaps unknowable, searches of their electronic devices. When po-
lice perform a search under the Katz test, they must get a warrant (or 
consent), which informs the person that a search is taking place. Other-
wise a person can assume that her information is safe and conduct her 
business accordingly. Recognizing this interest in people knowing when 
they are being monitored, statutes such as the Stored Communications 
Act (which covers electronic communications data not protected by the 
Fourth Amendment) require notice to the target.50 These notice provi-
sions are essential, as otherwise citizens might curtail their activities just 
in case they are being surveilled.51  
A digital trespass theory of Fourth Amendment searches is neces-
sary to maintain the relevance of the Supreme Court’s Jones decision in 
an age of increasingly pervasive technology. Although a physical tres-
pass may no longer be necessary to track our movements, communica-
tions, or contacts, the government is still taking a targeted action to ac-
quire information it could not otherwise gather. Neither existing trespass 
law, existing criminal law, nor existing Fourth Amendment law bars the 
expansion of Jones to digital trespasses. Doing so would protect the pri-
vacy of Americans in the twenty-first century and ensure our actions 
remain unconstrained by the fear of secret surveillance. 
  
 49. Cyrus Farivar, Irate Congressman Gives Cops Easy Rule: “Just Follow the Damn Consti-
tution,” WIRED (Apr. 30, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/30/irate-congressman-
gives-cops-easy-rule-just-follow-the-damn-constitution/.  
 50. This notice can be delayed up to 90 days after the surveillance if certain conditions are 
met. 18 U.S.C. § 2705. 
 51. There is evidence journalists have changed their behavior in response to the disclosure of 
NSA surveillance programs. With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large Scale US Surveillance is 
Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem14-withlibertytomonitorall-
07282014.pdf.  
